IM@GO
A JOURNAL OF THE SOCIAL IMAGINARY

Interactions between a human and a Chat Bot: The Mythopoietic narrative of unlimited possibilities

Simone D'Alessandro
simone.dalessandro@unich.it
Department of Business Administration | University G. d' Annunzio of Chieti-Pescara

Francesco Ferzetti
francesco.ferzetti@unich.it
Department of Business Administration| University G. d' Annunzio of Chieti-Pescara

Abstract

Interactions between a human and a Chat Bot: The Mythopoietic narrative of unlimited possibilities

In the debate on the Large Language Models (LLM) there are three arguments that fuel the mythopoetic narrative concerning the emancipation of the artificial agent vis-à-vis the human being: 1. The conscious self-reflexive process; 2. The ability to deeply understand the 'semantics' of natural language; 3. The creative-transformative ability.

These arguments about the future self-emancipating possibilities of A.I. are being advanced by transhumanism and the current known as "Strong A.I.". However, such narratives have been disproved by a different concrete reality in which the interaction between human and chat bot remains asymmetrical: on the one hand we have a subject endowed with meaning and intentionality that is capable of changing and inventing content in an unpredictable way ; on the other hand we have an expert system that assembles content and combines expressive possibilities without fully understanding what it is doing. This article will falsify the mythopoetic construction by examining the prediction paradox, the Inverse Turing test, and the algorithmic hallucinations.

Keywords

Creativity | Mythopoiesis | Self-Reflexivity | Semantics | Strong A.I.

ISSN: 2281-8138

N. 23 - Year XIII / July 2024 pp. 23-37
www.imagojournal.it

1. Introduction

Human natural language has been defined in many ways: social institution par excellence (Berger and Berger, 1972), symbolically generalised medium (Luhmann and De Giorgi, 1992), technology of the self (Foucault, 1992). From different theoretical perspectives, human natural language remains incommensurable with other animal languages, as it is endowed with a recursive syntax, a creative semantics and a pragmatic-perlocutionary dimension (Austin, 1962) that builds circular links and emergent processes between thought, language and action.

Human language is characterised by the "recursive generation principle of discrete infinity that became available in evolutionary history (...) along with Homo Sapiens" (Chomsky and Moro, 2022: 37). Recursiveness is founded on finite syntactic structures and rules, capable of generating infinite combinations. While the scientific community has accepted this difference between human and non-human animal, it remains divided with respect to the relationship between human and artificial non-human.

The rhetorical and mythopoetic narratives of transhumanism[1] (Bostrom, 2016) and the 'strong I.A.' school (Dennett, 2023) fuel the utopia of the limitless possibilities of Large Language Models and machine-learning algorithms that characterise chatbots.

According to the arguments of these narratives, in the very near future it will be possible to construct artificial agents capable of faithfully reproducing the circular nexus between human thought, language and decision-making processes. Once such possibilities are reproduced, the non-human will go beyond the human being by emancipating itself from programming constraints; at the same time, certain characteristics of the human being will be able to be fully expressed by conscious technological possibilities (Bonito and Carrara, 2024).

On the contrary, according to the narrative of the proponents of the 'weak A.I.' school, there are ontologically insurmountable distinctions and limits that will never

[1] The term transhumanism has existed since 1927, coined by the biologist Julian Huxley, but only entered the discursive repertoires in 1998 when the Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom founded, together with the British philosopher David Pearce, the international organisation called the World Transhumanist Association (WTA). The Association's manifesto starts from the principle of the ultimate abolition of any kind of suffering through the use of technology. Transhumanism considers techno-poiesis to be a process capable of emancipating the human being from the biological, projecting him into a future in which it will be possible to extract the typical characteristics of human intelligence in order to graft them or replicate them on an artificial device. The term 'post-human' was, on the other hand, coined by Jeffrey Deitch in 1992 during an exhibition that drew several artists whose works questioned the human body and identity. In 1995, with the essay The Posthuman Condition, Robert Pepperell elaborated an initial theoretical definition of the posthuman as a research project based on new assumptions capable of going beyond the humanistic tradition. In 2007, the neo-evolutionary sociologist John Harris introduced the concept of enhancing evolution: the evolutionary improvement of the human assisted by factors foreign to natural evolution.

ISSN: 2281-8138

allow the conditions for a total assimilation of human characteristics within the artificial non-human (Searle, 2019).

There are three arguments that feed into the mythopoetic narrative of the possibilities for the full emancipation of the artificial agent.

The first argument is the question of consciousness determining the reflexivity of the self. According to the exponents of 'weak A.I'. it is the result of an evolutionary process of thousands of years that has led the substrate of biological organisms to interconnect, leading to the modern human brain. In this view, what distinguishes the human from the artificial agent is the number of connections between the elements that make up the thinking substrate (Tononi, 2008) but also the emerging processes constituted by the inter-human relations and the relations between thought, language and action (Donati, 2022). Conscious thought is a characteristic that machines do not possess, not least because, as Searle argues, if they did possess it, they would not be able to tell us humans through a language of their own, nor would they be able to make us perceive it with our senses. If they are not able to communicate it, then they are not aware of it. If they are not aware of it, then they do not possess consciousness. Consciousness is the result of functions that produce meta-cognition, i.e.: knowing that one is 'aware of knowing' and being able to 'communicate it to another' (Searle, 2019). The reflexive awareness of acting, peculiar to the human, consists of seeing ourselves interacting with the other and returning, reflexively in retrospect, to how we acted (Donati and Archer, 2010).

According to the strong A.I. school, consciousness is an epiphenomenon that can be generated as the complexity of synaptic connections increases. For transhumanists, consciousness represents an indispensable stage of the General Artificial Intelligence (AGI) that will characterise the next technological evolution.

In both cases we observe a narrative that builds mythical expectations of the future without having scientific foundations in the present.

The second argument is based on the 'semantic' issue. According to neo-humanist exponents of weak A.I. when we speak of intelligence, it is understanding that makes the difference: an exclusive, non-algorithmic property of consciousness (Faggin, 2022: 137). In other words, artificial intelligence is not able to 'comprehend' the meaning of what it assembles, even if it is able to use it through statistical combinations. Programming languages are endowed with syntactic recursiveness - as are all formal mathematical languages derived from human language - but lack a predisposition to discern the deeper meaning of symbols. Winograd's test (Winograd, 1972) and the Winogrande test (Sakaguchi et al., 2019) demonstrate the current inability of the artificial agent to comprehend ambiguous, paradoxical sentences with no explicit subject. Artificial agents do not even understand conversational assumptions and implicatures (Faggin, 2022). Following the narrative of transhumanists and exponents of 'strong AI', this inability is temporary and strictly dependent on the possibilities of technological progress: in the future, artificial agents will be able to understand content through gradual incremental innovation processes.

ISSN: 2281-8138

This perspective does not create ontological limits to technological pervasiveness and builds a "mythological imaginary of the superiority of artificial intelligence" (Bennato, 2024: 41) without any logical argument with respect to the real evolutionary possibilities: moving from non-comprehension to comprehension represents a radical innovation, not an incremental one. At this point in time, no programmer can understand how this paradigm shift is possible.

The third argument concerns the creative-transformative capacity of the human, which, according to weak AI exponents, is inherent to the human being and differs from the exploratory creative capacity of the artificial agent: whereas exploratory creativity merely recombines previous knowledge ad infinitum, transformative creativity allows the invention of new categories that make the unexpected 'emerge' (Klien, 2022; D'Alessandro, 2024). According to the proponents of weak A.I., transformative creativity is inherent to human capacity as it is closely related to the ability to 'decide to decide' in the absence of information and data (Simon, 1955) or in the presence of ambivalent and distorted information. This ability conflicts with the logic of predictability at finite states of algorithms (D'Alessandro, 2024). The person invents new categories, and this ability is related to comprehension which concerns the discovery (from self-awareness) of new connections between meanings that "exist in semantic space and leads to new conscious meaning structures that require new symbols to be communicated" (Faggin, 2022: 139). The person invents new symbols or voluntarily decides to do away with old ones. He or she also decides to change his or her point of view by reversing, combining, separating, or elaborating paradoxes that allow him or her to go beyond established knowledge (D'Alessandro, 2023). But above all, the human being can decide to 'renounce' by deactivating a pre-established path or scheme of action. The person can decide to improvise, even without having a pre-established plan. An artificial agent - even when guided by self-adapting algorithms that learn by trial and error - creates on the basis of the algorithm's indications and on the basis of existing combinations of data: if it composes music or generates paintings or produces other forms of language, it recombines styles and assembles rules that simulate past authors and aesthetic categories (Arielli and Manovich, 2022).

Strong A.I. and transhumanism oppose the narrative of insurmountable limits, but without scientific evidence. They construct a narrative based on the following assumption: "today it is not possible, but tomorrow this limit will be overcome".

This assumption is based on the theory of the singularity (Kurzweil, 2005): a paradigmatic shift and evolutionary enhancement (Harris, 2007) co-administered by factors unrelated to the natural evolution of humans. The 'singular' phenomena have in common that small variations in a specific evolutionary phenomenon can cause large discontinuities. In sociological terms, this means that small artificial changes, metabolised by the human being, would greatly and quickly disrupt the current condition of sociality and inter-human relations, building a discontinuity between artificial human and non-human, facilitating any form of hybridisation.

In the following paragraphs we will attempt to falsify the mythopoetic narrative of the transhumanist-strong A.I. perspective by examining - through examples of

N. 23 – Year XIII / July 2024 pp. 23-37 ISSN: 2281-8138
imagojournal.it

human/chat bot interaction - the three arguments: 1. Consciousness/(Self-) reflexivity; 2. Semantic comprehension; 3 Transformative creativities.

In exposing the false myths and controversial narratives, we will start from the relational theoretical assumption that artificial agents can be endowed with agency if we give this term a 'weak' and 'non-symmetrical' definition with respect to human agency. In other words, we accept the definition of agency as the ability to make a difference, i.e. to exercise power without being directly aware of it. Both humans and artificial agents are endowed with agency, in that they perform actions that have consequences, but the character of this agency should not be understood as equivalent: "Human agents have intentions and forms of awareness that machines do not possess. The two types of agencies are separate, but intertwined, and their consequences are emergent" (Airoldi, 2024: 73-74). From this point of view, we distance ourselves from Latour's theory that puts human and non-human actors on the same level, but we recognise the artificial agent as having a social life that has similarities with Bourdieu's theories of human practice (Bourdieu, 2009).

According to the current paradigmatic understanding of the origin and significance of Western modernity, multiple processes of modernisation effectively inverted the traditional hierarchical ordering of 'the secular' (the ordinary, worldly, and the profane) and 'the sacred' (the extra-ordinary, the holy, and the venerated). This inversion, it is claimed, was established in the wake of a profound 'metaphysical shudder' that fractured the moral, cultural and political foundations of key European social formations in the period between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Prior to this, in pre-modern contexts, human life conceived of itself in hierophantic terms; the *hieros* being deemed both ontologically and epistemologically foundational, with the secular positioned as a secondary phenomenon; restricted and theologically conditioned in the context of Christianity as a lesser juridical reality within Augustine's fallen 'City of Man'.[2] In modernity, however, secularity is seen as having thoroughly profaned itself; achieving for itself a new autonomy in the attainment of an ontological, world-forming and informing, potentiality in its own right. Within modernity, it is claimed, the secular emerges as the force of history; as 'time liberated' for human purposes and plans. In modernity, secular time is no longer the time between the incarnation and the *eschaton*. On the contrary, in modernity the secular now presents itself as the new infinitude of 'historical progress' founded upon the radical opening of the time horizon; as an empty, undecidable, yet projectable and malleable, human-centred, futurity. As such, within secular temporality, the distinction between an unalterable (but knowledge-worthy)

[2] However, in pre-modern contexts, although it is widely argued that the sacred was primary both ontologically and politically, the sacred and the profane were deemed to be conceptually and existentially inseparable domains; with the secular being defined in terms of the sacred, the former being viewed as a degenerate albeit outgrowth of the latter. This can again be seen in Christianity, where the sacred was no longer located in people or things, but in the dimensions of time, to the extent that the secular itself was understood as simply the time between the two historical sacralites of the incarnation and the *eschaton*.

past and an open future occupies the place once occupied by the immanent and the transcendent, of a 'here' and a 'beyond' (see Kossellneck, 2005: 212).

However, this, orthodox, conception of secularity is itself founded upon a series of often unquestioned and unquestionable assumptions. In this paper, I intend to interrogate some of these assumptions, in order reveal the presence of a concealed sacrality *within* the secular. Indeed, I aim to show that what philosophers and social theorists refer to as 'secularity' is simply a theological mutation within the Judeo-Christian theological imaginary; one that we can, in its dis-incarnational rejection of nature over grace, following Voeglin, position as 'Gnostic' (see Voegelin, 2012).

In this vein, I will suggest that the sacred within the secular is fundamentally acosmic; residing beyond the realm of nature, which is now handed over to the dark fate of impersonal mechanism, as a series of spiritually blind causes within a larger order of causal necessity. In its radical separation of sacred from the cosmos, the secular relocates the sacred within the infinitude of the subject, within a realm of radical freedom, where the self no longer has any spiritual communion with things but only with other selves, to the extent that politics itself takes on a heightened spiritual dimension (see Jonas, 2001). In making this claim, I will endeavour to show that what at first glance appears to be the waning of sacrality of modern contexts, in reality is simply an effect of a hard-to-discern *transformation*. From a conception of sacrality primarily located in the outer realms of people and things, to one found in the relative immateriality of personal and political discourse - from 'the invisible in natural things', to 'the visible in political words'.

In what follows, my approach will be deliberately and self-consciously theoretical. In the present era, when various forms of bland empiricism and the ideology of scientism blind us to any need for new ideas and alternative ways of imagining the social-historical, it is essential that work in the Humanities again begins to move along critical and speculative paths. For 'facts without theories are blind' – and it is only the vision of the theorist that is able to transform the crises of our age into something thought-worthy and, ultimately, able to render our responses choice-worthy. In so doing, I will make the theory-driven claim that in the passage to modernity the sacred was sublimated into a form where it became abstracted and further esoterisised as it was uprooted from its cosmological groundings and rearticulated into the modern imaginaries of politics and law. My key claim will be that within modern contexts the 'sacrality of the secular' ultimately resides within a new type of political textuality – in the idea of a sacred constitution that manifests itself in the utopian recognition and obligation of a people with/to itself and to all other peoples. In other words, I will suggest that in modern contexts, the sacred becomes disembedded within the futurity of the symbolic orders of the political and is therefore neither diminished nor diluted but simply relocated and rearticulated within founding political texts – texts that possess quite specific ontological, world-transforming, effects. In this way, I will claim that within secular modernity the sacred emerges as a geo-political ideal of universal freedom that presents itself as necessary *a priori* political truth that applies universally to all peoples, all places, and for all time. It is in this sense that the modern sacred retains its link with the *eschaton* via its

ISSN: 2281-8138

implicit connection to the ideal of an end of history, the time when the moral and political obligations of the founding political text will be fulfilled and realised for all peoples - as the political eschaton's full worldly realisation.

2. The Mith of digital self-reflexivity: in search of a new oracle

Self-reflexivity allows one to experience oneself as the subject of one's own existence in relation to an 'alter' who enters into relationship within a context. According to current international research, algorithms cannot 'think' or 'think about thinking': dimensions that are biunivocally implied (Searle, 2019). A chat bot driven by a Large Language Model (LLM) cannot be conscious of being a subject of its own existence in relation to an alter but it can "participate in communication (...) bots are authors of about 50 per cent of online traffic" (Esposito, 2022: 9).

It is appropriate to establish the differences between human thought and the machine-learning algorithm that characterises the large language model (LLM) of a chat bot, in order to deactivate a narrative that risks constructing a distorted collective vision: the analogy between the performance of algorithms and the conscious capacity of human intelligence is misleading (Esposito, 2022: 2).

The possibility of conversational exchange and content transfer between human and non-human does not necessarily imply the concept of intelligence, nor that of consciousness. The relationship takes place if there is a willingness on the part of the human being to believe and trust in the meaningfulness of the chat bot's arguments.

The intentionality and reflexivity regarding the decision to give credence and trust to the contents of the artificial agent depend on the inner conversation of the human being (Archer, 2006). From this point of view, the relationship is asymmetrical: the chat bot has no trust or willingness to believe in the conversation constructed with the human. The chat bot merely constructs the process, while the human decides to 'believe' (or not believe) in the process it is constructing.

This asymmetry is particularly evident when the human interrogates the chat bot, trusting in its ability to anticipate future themes and trends. Prediction takes place through a trust mechanism that the human being possesses, but which the chat bot lacks. A chat bot (such as Gemini or Gpt 3.5) assembles data entered by the human, regardless of whether the other (human) will (or will not) trust the conversation data. Such data represent what has already happened, but not what has yet to happen. It is the trust relationship established by the human being that determines the actual reification of a prediction data. We are witnessing a mythopoetic phenomenon: the narration of the predictive capacity of artificial intelligence. This phenomenon has been described by Helga Nowotny as the "prediction paradox" (Nowotny, 2022: 19).

If human behaviour conforms to the bot's predictions, the future comes true in a deterministic way:

> The predictive power of algorithms gives us the ability to see further ahead (...) The way we do this, however, is paradoxical: We yearn to know the future, but

ISSN: 2281-8138

> we largely ignore what the predictions do to us (...) The paradox arises from the incompatibility between an algorithmic function, such as an abstract mathematical equation can be, and a human belief that might be strong enough to move us to action (Nowotny, 2022: 20).

The predictive power of algorithms can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. But the prediction becomes true because people decide to believe and act accordingly, avoiding changing the course of the future while having the reflexive ability to boycott it. In fact, not all prophecies triggered by mass communication come true, as human beings possess an unpredictable ability to self-boycott their own beliefs.

However, with the constant increase of predictive algorithms, Thomas' theorem[3] runs the risk of becoming an automatic practice. Thus, algorithms can model the future behavior of humans through past data. In this sense, Esposito pays attention to some similarities between ancient divination practices and predictive algorithms (Esposito, 2022): we are favoring a world that is determined from the past, simply because we have reflexively decided not to question the data analysis processed by the algorithmic oracle. This fate does not depend on the will of an artificial agent, but on the reflexive intentionality of a human being who, at any time, can decide to change his or her opinion and interpretation. In the next paragraphs we will examine the Inverse Turing test and some examples of conversation between researchers and Chat BOTs. Cases that show the circular links between self-reflexivity, semantic comprehension, and human transformative creativity, highlighting further limitations of A.I. with respect to such arguments.

3. The false narrative of semantic comprehension

Machine learning algorithms are efficient because programmers have abandoned the attempt to simulate human intelligence, artificially reproducing only the ability to make the chat bot 'believable' in interaction with the person. The artificial agent participates in conversations by simulating an interaction, but not a meaningful relationship: this is the real and pragmatic narrative proposed by the programmers; a storytelling that has been distorted by the narrative of transhumanism. The ability to understand the nuances of a sentence or the ability to disambiguate are inherently human characteristics.

The current Inverse Turing test[4] highlights some of the semantic inability.

CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart, also referred to as Inverse Turing Test) recognizes a human

3 In 1928 Thomas states, "If men define certain situations as real, they are real in their consequences." Assertion reformulated by Robert K. Merton in the terms of self-fulfilling prophecy, in Social Theory and Structure, II, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1971.

4 From the 1950s to the present, numerous tests have been developed that can unmask the artificial agent: from the classical Turing test to Searle's Chinese Room; from the Silence test to the Reverse Turing; from the Lovelace test on creativity to the Winograd test on ambiguous sentences.

interaction by distinguishing it from a non-human one. The test protects human users from spam and password decryption. The CAPTCHA test has two parts: a randomly generated sequence of letters and/or numbers displayed in a distorted image and a text box. To pass the test and prove that they are human, the user must type the distorted symbols into the text box and recognize what the test asks for.

The artificial agent fails in the task of reconstructing distorted images. It needs corrective actions by the human to guide its exact response. Evidence of the deterministic fallibility of the artificial agent comes, moreover, from computer programs used to unmask other programs that generate fake news[5]: the artificial agent is able to unmask the action of another artificial agent, but it cannot distinguish an artificial user from a human being. This is also why 21st century programmers do not try to emulate human intelligence (Solon, 2012; Esposito, 2022).

For example, programmers of Libratus - an AI expert system that defeated top human players in January 2017 - show that A.I. even when it wins develops a totally different game strategy than humans: "complex algorithms work in well-defined situations (...) while human intelligence has evolved to handle uncertainty regardless of the amount of data available" (Gigerenzer, 2023: 57).

Artificial agents win or lose differently than humans. Artificial intelligence systems process automated decision-making processes: as such, they are improvable in the learning phase, but limited in exploring the unknown because they are caged by the storage of previously accumulated data. We need to rethink the way we observe its interaction with humans. The simulation of a relationship is believable, but it is not true. It is structured on the level of logic, but fragile when it has to reason in metalinguistic, paradoxical and ambivalent terms. The artificial agent can handle risk but cannot deal with uncertainty. In situations of risk, it is possible to know possible outcomes in advance and calculate probable consequences.

In situations of uncertainty, it is impossible to know all possible outcomes in advance (Knight, 1921). Human beings make decisions even when the scenario is undecidable. The person always has the will to unlock a problematic situation and make a decision, even a casual one. Because of this central difference, we cannot speak of authentic conversation between human and nonhuman, nor of relationship, but of simulated interaction.

The human being projects his intelligence, his relational attitude and his reflective vocation onto whatever artefact he is able to interact with. This demonstrates two great capacities that are properly human: the metaphorical one (which builds links between distant worlds) and the empathic one (which allows to empathise with the *alter*, even when it is not human). But this gift also hides a vulnerability, which consists in the desire to be deceived by the AI in order to be reassured and to confirm one's own self-deception on metaphorical projection (Natale, 2022).

5 For example, the Giant Language Model Test Room (Glmtr). See: www.agendadigitale.eu/cultura-digitale/intelligenza-artificiale-contro-le-fake-news-lo-stato-della-ricerca

These latter considerations are related to the algorithmic hallucinations and creative limitations that we will consider in the following paragraph.

4. The (unfulfilled) promise of transformative creativity

Roberto Presilla reports the example of a professor who asked Chat GPT, the logical sentence analysis of some impersonal expressions, demonstrating the bot's inability to perform proper logical analysis[6].

The bot fails if it is not guided by the human user through successive trial and error. The chat bot does not infer from context an impersonal expression that refers to an unspoken subject. The tool is unable to contextualize and disambiguate independently on the first try, often not even after numerous repetitions.

Thierry Vissol, on April 8, 2023, reports in an article published in Page 21, his failed experience as a scholar trying to interact with Chat GPT for research purposes:

> I was doing research on the Upper Palaeolithic (...) I decided to test to what extent Chat GPT could help me both in the various topics of my research and in searching bibliographies. The results obtained immediately seemed (...) valid. The topic summaries were short, but coherent (...) So I continued for more than a day to ask more and more precise questions, getting quick and documented answers (...) within seconds. I began to have doubts when I systematically asked for summaries of articles or books, which appeared extremely similar to each other, but formulated differently. Such homogeneity of various authors on controversial topics seemed very strange to me[7].

After numerous cross-checks, the researcher discovered that most of the references provided by Chat GPT did not exist. The information had been invented by the artificial agent. The authors cited were not specialists or had never written the articles cited. The publishers had not published the cited books which had never been published by other publishers either.

These examples show the inability of the bot to give up research when the information does not exist or does not adequately help the interlocutor who requested the data. The phenomenon has been called algorithmic hallucination: "when we ask a chatbot for the definition of something that does not exist, and the program gives us a credible but false document"[8].

[6] R. Presilla, *ChatGPT non è intelligente ma si applica*, https://rivista.vitaepensiero.it/news-vp-plus-chatgpt-non-e-intelligente-ma-si-applica-6096.html , 25, febbraio, 2023.
[7] T. Vissol, *La mia esperienza con Open Ai Chat Gpt*, www.pagina21.eu/la-mia-esperienza-con-openai-chat-gpt-una-truffa-pericolosa/thierry-vissol/ 8 aprile 2023.
[8] N. Klein, N. *Le allucinazioni del capitalismo,* www.internazionale.it/magazine/naomi-klein/2023/06/08/le-allucinazioni-del-capitalismo 26/08/2023.

The term 'hallucination' instead of the more correct expression 'system error' fits into that process of mythopoeic storytelling that evokes a supposed artificial subject endowed with consciousness and capable of stepping out of the paths of reason through hallucinations.

This anthropomorphization process had already been constructed in the past with other terms: 'artificial intelligence' replaced 'expert system'; 'semantic web' replaced 'adaptive search engine.' Misleading terminologies that construct an imagery meant to mirror human faculties, proposing a digital doppelgänger.

No programmer has been able to solve the anomalies caused by algorithmic hallucinations. Sundar Pichai, A.D. of Alphabet, admits that it is impossible to avoid these system errors caused by the chat bot's inability to decide to give up. More than 40 percent of responses provided by chatbots are incorrect or anomalous[9].

The chat bot does not go outside the programmed request process, so it must necessarily give an answer, even if it is wrong. While the human has the intentionality and willingness to give up, sabotage the request or go off topic.

5. Conclusions. Chat bots and mythopoetic narratives

From the considerations considered in the preceding paragraphs, a counter-narrative emerges that downsizes the mythopoetic narrative of strong AI and transhumanism. We remain fundamentally distinct and unreplicable persons from the capabilities of A.I. (Osborne and Rose, 2023:1). A chat bot can establish a simulated conversation with a human being, but this interaction is limited on the level of reciprocity in the following dimensions that manifest a circular relationship between them:

- *Dimension of self-reflexivity.* Trust, intention to believe, expectations, and predictive paradoxes prove, indirectly, the human's self-reflexive ability to accept or question what happened during a conversation. The bot can reconfigure parameters, assigning new measures to the words produced by the exchange, but it cannot decide to remove or go off-topic to provoke a contingency; nor can it interrupt a discourse deemed unsuccessful by the interlocutors; nor can it converse inwardly to revise planned decisions.

- *Dimension of semantic comprehension.* The bot assembles content, but is incapable of understanding, disambiguating, and contextualizing it. Humans pose critical considerations that allow them to dialectically dissect an argument by fragmenting it, reversing it, combining it with other elements even off-topic, to the point of paradoxically playing with the argument itself to reclassify it. Humans understand paradoxes, implicatures, subject-less or distorted sentences. Chat bots,

[9] www.tomshw.it/altro/chatgpt-sbaglia-il-50-delle-domande-di-programmazione-altro-che-rubare-il-lavoro/ 27/09/2023.

while adapting through trial and error to human demands, are incapable of contextualizing, disambiguating, and understanding in the full meaning of the term. Knowing how to use a language by assembling its terms stochastically does not, necessarily, imply the ability to comprehend.

• *Creative-transformative dimension.* It follows from the preceding point that the human ability to 'play' with plausible interpretations, allows for transformative and not merely exploratory creativity. Along this path, even the communicative process involved in the intentionality of the human differs from the interactive simulation of the artificial nonhuman. The intentionality of the human involves a double contingency consisting of expectations that make the conversational outcome with another person unpredictable. This is not the case with an algorithm that meets the expectations of its interlocutor regardless of the degree of truthfulness of content. Finally, human creativity is intersubjectively formed, "as a result of the interaction between the experiences of individual social actors" (Pedroni, 2005: 459) and is the emergent outcome of widespread educational and social practices (Glăveanu, Hanson and Baer, 2019).

The emerging relationship between the capacity for semantic understanding, transformative creativity, and self-reflexivity determines the difference between the generative unpredictability of the human relationship and the recursive cage of human/chat bot interaction. When transhumanism and strong A.I. propose "non-humanistic conceptions of the human condition, in which anthropology is replaced by anthropotechnics" (Maccarini, 2021: 192) they fall into a pseudo-scientific fallacy, re-proposing a Cartesian dualism (res-cogitans/res-extensa), projected into a future in which it will be possible to extract the typical characteristics of human intelligence and graft them onto a non-human device. However, human intelligence is embodied: dependent on the human body. This is demonstrated by scholars in cognitive science (Noë, 2010), neurology and social neuroscience (Ehrenberg, 2019). If we eliminate the body, we also subtract creative processes from the cognitive system: "all abilities, even the most abstract, arise as bodily practices" (Sennett, 2009: 19). But then, why do humans continue to have the need to build narrative imaginaries about AI that are so distant from the actual and concrete possibilities given by reality?

> There is a propensity to describe AI with both overly optimistic or pessimistic tones, which confirms a long-term trend (...) In other words, both utopian and dystopian narratives trace back to the main recurrent hopes and fears connected to technology (Sartori and Bocca, 2023: 446).

The narrators of infinite possibilities underestimate these factors, constructing a mythopoiesis that would like to eliminate the ontologically irreducible distinctions between human intelligence and A.I. in order to propagate a supposed conscious autonomy of A.I. capable of transcending human capacities. A return to a dogmatic scientism: a déjà vu that recurs every time an innovation is implemented, where the rhetoric of infinite possibilities evolves into a techno-religion.

ISSN: 2281-8138

Bibliography

Airoldi M. (2024), *Machine Habitus. Sociologia degli algoritmi,* Roma, Luiss University Press.

Archer M. S. (2006), *La conversazione interiore. Come nasce l'agire sociale,* Milano, Erickson.

Arielli E., Manovich L. (2022), "AI-aesthetics and the anthropocentric myth of creativity"*, Nodes,* 19, (20): 91-97.

Austin J. L. (1962), *How to do things with words,* Oxford, Clarendon.

Bennato D. (2024), *La società del XXI secolo. Persone, dati, tecnologie,* Bari-Roma*,* Laterza.

Berger L., Berger B. (1972), *Sociology: a biographical approach,* New York, Basic Books.

Bonito C., Carrara A. (2024), *Il transumanesimo. Una sfida antropologia alla scienza e alla fede,* Milano, Mimesis.

Bostrom N. (2016), *Superintelligenc*e, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Bourdieu P. (2009), *Ragioni pratiche,* Bologna, il Mulino.

Chomsky N., Moro A. (2022), *I segreti delle parole*, Milano, La nave di Teseo.

D'Alessandro S. (2024), "The predictable and disabling society: artificial intelligence and changing Human Agency", *Sociétés Revue de Sciences Humaines et Sociales*, 163 (1): 73-84.

D'Alessandro S. (2023), "Creative Flows: Constructions of Meaning between Binary Oppositions, Paradoxes and Common Sense"*, Italian Sociological Review*, 13, (3): 371-392.

Dennett D. (2023), *Coscienza. Che cosa è*, Bari-Roma, Laterza.

Donati P., Archer M. (2010), "Riflessività, modernizzazione e società civile", *Sociologia e Politiche Sociali*, 13, (1).

Donati P. (2022), *La teoria relazionale nelle scienze sociali: sviluppi e prospettive*, Bologna, il Mulino.

N. 23 – Year XIII / July 2024 pp. 23-37
imagojournal.it
ISSN: 2281-8138

Esposito E. (2022), *Comunicazione artificiale. Come gli algoritmi producono intelligenza sociale*, Milano, Bocconi University Press.

Ehrenberg A. (2019), *La meccanica delle passioni. Cervello, comportamento, società*, Torino, Einaudi.

Faggin F. (2022), *Irriducibile. La coscienza, la vita, i computer e la nostra natura,* Milano, Mondadori.

Foucault M. (1992), *Tecnologie del sé*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri.

Gigerenzer G. (2023), *Perché l'intelligenza umana batte ancora gli algoritmi,* Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Glăveanu V. P., Hanson M. H., Baer J. (2019), Advancing Creativity Theory and Research: A Socio-cultural Manifesto*, Journal of Creative Behavior*, 51, (3): 741-745.

Harris J. (2007), *Enhancing Evolution*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Klein S. (2022), *Come cambiamo il mondo. Breve storia della creatività umana*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri.

Klein N. (2023), *Le allucinazioni del capitalismo,* www.internazionale.it/magazine/naomi-klein/2023/06/08/le-allucinazioni-del-capitalismo, 26/08/2023.

Knight F. H. (1921), *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit,* Boston, Houghton Mifflin.

Kurzweil R. (2008), *La singolarità è vicina,* Milano, Apogeo.

Luhmann N., De Giorgi R. (1992), *Teoria della società,* Milano, Franco Angeli.

Maccarini A. (2021), "Post-umano", in Marci, T. e Tomelleri S. (a cura di), *Dizionario di Sociologia per la persona*, Milano, Franco Angeli: 191-193.

Merton R. K. (1971), *Teoria e Struttura Sociale*, Bologna, il Mulino.

Natale S. (2022), *Macchine ingannevoli. Comunicazione, Tecnologia, intelligenza artificiale,* Torino, Einaudi.

Noë A. (2010), *Perché non siamo il nostro cervello. Una teoria radicale della coscienza*, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

ISSN: 2281-8138

Nowotny H. (2022), *Le macchine di Dio. Gli algoritmi predittivi e l'illusione del controllo*, Roma, Luiss University Press.

Osborne T., Rose N. (2023), **"**Against Posthumanism: Notes towards an Ethopolitics of Personhood"*, in Theory, Culture & Society,* 40, (3): 1-19.

Pedroni M., (2005), "Genio individuale o pratica sociale? Le mille facce della creatività", *Studi di Sociologia*, 4: 439-461

Presilla R., (2023), *ChatGPT non è intelligente ma si applica*, https://rivista.vitaepensiero.it/news-vp-plus-chatgpt-non-e-intelligente-ma-si-applica-6096.html, 25, febbraio, 2023.

Sakaguchi K., Le Bras R., Bhagavatula C., Choi Y. (2019), *WINOGRANDE: An Adversarial Winograd Schema Challenge at Scale*, Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, University of Washington, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.10641.pdf

Sartori L., Bocca G. (2023), "Minding the gap(s): public perceptions of AI and socio-technical imaginaries", *AI & Society,* 38: 443-458.

Searle J. (2019), *Il mistero della realtà*, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Sennett R. (2009), *L'uomo Artigiano*, Milano, Feltrinelli.

Simon H.A. (1955), "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice"*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69, 1: 99-118.

Solon O. (2012), *Weavrs. "*The autonomous, Tweeting Blog-Bots That Feed"*, Social Content* Wired, 28/03/2012.

Tononi G. (2008), "Consciousness ad integrated information: a provisional manifesto", *Biological Bulletin Journal,* 215: 216-242.

Vissol T. (2023), *La mia esperienza con Open Ai Chat Gpt*, www.pagina21.eu/la-mia-esperienza-con-openai-chat-gpt-una-truffa-pericolosa/thierry-vissol/ 8 aprile 2023.

Winograd T. (1972), "Understanding Natural Language", *Cognitive Psychology,* 3, (1): 1-191.

www.agendadigitale.eu/cultura-digitale/intelligenza-artificiale-contro-le-fake-news-lo-stato-della-ricerca, 10/06/2023.

www.tomshw.it/altro/chatgpt-sbaglia-il-50-delle-domande-di-programmazione-altro-che-rubare-il-lavoro, 27/09/2023.

N. 23 – Year XIII / July 2024 pp. 23-37
imagojournal.it
ISSN: 2281-8138