The creation of a monetary union with a single central bank without fiscal union, can be considered as one of the critical factors behind current issues in the euro area. The most critical factor concerns the function of the European Central Bank (ECB) within the EMU and particularly the absence (or paucity) of role of lender of last resort typical of any central bank. Only the inflation is the European Central Bank's primary objective (Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 127). The structure draws an atypical Central Bank (BC) compared to other BC as Fed in the US or BoE in the UK. The aim of the study is to show the divergence in yields of euro zone sovereign bonds is not dependent on the underlying fundamentals, but rather by market sentiment and intervention capacity of the ECB. To protect commercial banks from default due to illiquidity and the financial system from serious damage and contagion effects, the ECB must to take on the role of lender of last resort. Intervening in a non–optimal, it has contributed to the differences between member countries, supporting self–fulfilling crises. The paper aims to examine the role of the ECB in setting up intra–European imbalances.

La BCE come fonte di squilibri

Matteo Foglia
2017

Abstract

The creation of a monetary union with a single central bank without fiscal union, can be considered as one of the critical factors behind current issues in the euro area. The most critical factor concerns the function of the European Central Bank (ECB) within the EMU and particularly the absence (or paucity) of role of lender of last resort typical of any central bank. Only the inflation is the European Central Bank's primary objective (Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 127). The structure draws an atypical Central Bank (BC) compared to other BC as Fed in the US or BoE in the UK. The aim of the study is to show the divergence in yields of euro zone sovereign bonds is not dependent on the underlying fundamentals, but rather by market sentiment and intervention capacity of the ECB. To protect commercial banks from default due to illiquidity and the financial system from serious damage and contagion effects, the ECB must to take on the role of lender of last resort. Intervening in a non–optimal, it has contributed to the differences between member countries, supporting self–fulfilling crises. The paper aims to examine the role of the ECB in setting up intra–European imbalances.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11564/697348
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