The Snowdrift Game, a commonly adopted model for studying cooperation in a competitive scenario, serves as a framework in this work. Computer simulations are used to investigate how variations in the payoff structure affect the strategies adopted by players. Two scenarios with distinct payoff parameters are explored. Players engage in strategies aligned with game theory principles. The distribution of these strategies is examined through an ecological perspective. The findings of the work are in line with the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, implying a higher prevalence of cooperation in the scenario offering greater rewards for mutual cooperation. These results demonstrate the significant influence of payoff manipulation on cooperative behaviour within the game.

Studying the distribution of strategies in the two-scenario Snowdrift Game

Edgardo Bucciarelli
;
Aurora Ascatigno
;
2024-01-01

Abstract

The Snowdrift Game, a commonly adopted model for studying cooperation in a competitive scenario, serves as a framework in this work. Computer simulations are used to investigate how variations in the payoff structure affect the strategies adopted by players. Two scenarios with distinct payoff parameters are explored. Players engage in strategies aligned with game theory principles. The distribution of these strategies is examined through an ecological perspective. The findings of the work are in line with the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, implying a higher prevalence of cooperation in the scenario offering greater rewards for mutual cooperation. These results demonstrate the significant influence of payoff manipulation on cooperative behaviour within the game.
2024
978-3-031-75586-6
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11564/849394
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