In this paper we consider all-optical networks in which a service provider has to satisfy a given set of communication requests. Each request is charged a cost depending on its wavelength and on the wavelengths of the other requests met along its path in the network. Under the assumption that each request is issued by a selfish agent, we seek for payment strategies which can guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium, that is an assignment of paths to the requests so that no request can lower its cost by choosing a different path in the network. For such strategies, we bound the loss of performance of the network (price of anarchy) by comparing the number of wavelengths used by the worst pure Nash equilibrium with that of a centralized optimal solution.
The Price of Anarchy in All-Optical Networks
MOSCARDELLI, Luca
2004-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we consider all-optical networks in which a service provider has to satisfy a given set of communication requests. Each request is charged a cost depending on its wavelength and on the wavelengths of the other requests met along its path in the network. Under the assumption that each request is issued by a selfish agent, we seek for payment strategies which can guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium, that is an assignment of paths to the requests so that no request can lower its cost by choosing a different path in the network. For such strategies, we bound the loss of performance of the network (price of anarchy) by comparing the number of wavelengths used by the worst pure Nash equilibrium with that of a centralized optimal solution.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
