Piattaforme multilaterali e Google Book Search: quali assetti competitivi dopo il Settlement Agreement?

The Google Books Search initiative, and in particular the related possible anticompetitive effects implied by the approval of the Settlement Agreement – the settlement between Google, the Authors Guild, the Association of American Publishers and a handful of authors and publishers – is a much debated question worldwide, though the scientific literature concerning this issue is still at an embryonic stage. This literature, as well as the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, has essentially been investigating the anticompetitive impact of single clauses by using a traditional analysis framework, that is by focusing on the ebooks market and on the operators’ incentives schemes that would characterize the post-settlement situation, suggesting some remedies accordingly. The thesis presented in this essay is that the possible anticompetitive effects caused by the initiative are correctly assessed when considering the multilateral platform of Google (a platform which internalizes the externalities between Google’s services users and advertisers) and the significant network effects which generate between complementary products (i.e. ebooks, readers, DRM systems). When the analysis is extended this way, Google’s incentives scheme changes and the anticompetitive threats associated to some of these clauses substantially slim down, while modifications of the settlement agreement become necessary in order to limit Google’s ability to monopolize markets of complementary products.