trade union concern for job security is modelled under asymmetric information about labour demand, with rigid wage. Sequential decision processe are discussed: for the individual, on whether to join the union; for the union, about the contribution to charge; for the employer, on the level of labour to hire. Equilibrium and "disequilibrium" solutions with shocked output price are provided in a general and algebraic formulation. Simulations with 1982 British data are shown, with shocks on probability of fall in output price, on technology, and on working time.

A structural model of trade union behaviour under uncertainty, with sticky wage.

PARODI, Giuliana
1989-01-01

Abstract

trade union concern for job security is modelled under asymmetric information about labour demand, with rigid wage. Sequential decision processe are discussed: for the individual, on whether to join the union; for the union, about the contribution to charge; for the employer, on the level of labour to hire. Equilibrium and "disequilibrium" solutions with shocked output price are provided in a general and algebraic formulation. Simulations with 1982 British data are shown, with shocks on probability of fall in output price, on technology, and on working time.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11564/268396
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