We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategy population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics
Sacco P.
2008-01-01
Abstract
We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategy population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2008.pdf
Solo gestori archivio
Descrizione: Article
Tipologia:
PDF editoriale
Dimensione
1.56 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.56 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
|
Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamic.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Documento in Pre-print
Dimensione
400.8 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
400.8 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
