We study a model of the evolutionary selection of social standards of behavior in a large public organization, in terms of the propensity to bribery of the organization's rent-seeking officers. We examine several scenarios, allowing for the existence of various types of anti-corruption sanctioning mechanisms, for the role of pro-social, interiorized value systems, for the impact of informational costs on the viability of "informationally sophisticated" players. The conditions under which corruption is eventually eliminated or at least kept under control in the various scenarios are derived and discussed.

The emergence of deontological codes in public administration

Sacco P.
2002-01-01

Abstract

We study a model of the evolutionary selection of social standards of behavior in a large public organization, in terms of the propensity to bribery of the organization's rent-seeking officers. We examine several scenarios, allowing for the existence of various types of anti-corruption sanctioning mechanisms, for the role of pro-social, interiorized value systems, for the impact of informational costs on the viability of "informationally sophisticated" players. The conditions under which corruption is eventually eliminated or at least kept under control in the various scenarios are derived and discussed.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11564/774115
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