We model interaction within the members of a work group, who carry on different projects and can choose to cooperate with each other or to exploit the work of the others. We focus our attention on the dynamic interdependence between their material performance and the structure of the relations among them. In particular, we assume that their satisfaction depends both upon the material outcome of their projects and upon the quality of their reciprocal relations (so that these two aspects are seen, to a certain extent, as psychological substitutes). As dissatisfaction may generate the disruption of social links, the consequent failure of the projects is a possible outcome. In turn, satisfactory relations and stable cooperation may loop positively together. Our model merges game theory and network representation of the relations among actors, thus opening a route of research that, to our knowledge, has not yet been explored.
Network Interaction with Material and Relational Goods: An Exploratory Simulation
Sacco P.
;
2000-01-01
Abstract
We model interaction within the members of a work group, who carry on different projects and can choose to cooperate with each other or to exploit the work of the others. We focus our attention on the dynamic interdependence between their material performance and the structure of the relations among them. In particular, we assume that their satisfaction depends both upon the material outcome of their projects and upon the quality of their reciprocal relations (so that these two aspects are seen, to a certain extent, as psychological substitutes). As dissatisfaction may generate the disruption of social links, the consequent failure of the projects is a possible outcome. In turn, satisfactory relations and stable cooperation may loop positively together. Our model merges game theory and network representation of the relations among actors, thus opening a route of research that, to our knowledge, has not yet been explored.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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