We discuss game-theoretic interpretations of Rawls's theory of justice with special reference to the choice of the most appropriate solution concept. We show that Core-like solution concepts, as the one proposed by Laden (1991, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20, 189-222), have undesirable implications in this context. The "Bargaining Set" has more satisfactory properties for any contractualistic approach.
Game-theoretic definitions of fairness and the contractualistic foundations of justice
Sacco P.
1997-01-01
Abstract
We discuss game-theoretic interpretations of Rawls's theory of justice with special reference to the choice of the most appropriate solution concept. We show that Core-like solution concepts, as the one proposed by Laden (1991, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20, 189-222), have undesirable implications in this context. The "Bargaining Set" has more satisfactory properties for any contractualistic approach.File in questo prodotto:
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