This paper studies the disequilibrium dynamics of the overlapping generations model with money under the assumption that agents are not aware of the strategic oppurtunities left open by non- equilibrium trade. The standard OG model is extended to a continuous time framework. It is found that the continuous time adjustment dynamics may be asymptotically equivalent to the discrete time generational dynamics. Some examples and comments on the general result are provided. © 1993.
Disequilibrium dynamics with naive agents in the overlapping generations model with money
Sacco P.
1993-01-01
Abstract
This paper studies the disequilibrium dynamics of the overlapping generations model with money under the assumption that agents are not aware of the strategic oppurtunities left open by non- equilibrium trade. The standard OG model is extended to a continuous time framework. It is found that the continuous time adjustment dynamics may be asymptotically equivalent to the discrete time generational dynamics. Some examples and comments on the general result are provided. © 1993.File in questo prodotto:
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