In this paper I deal with Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of categorical (Greek passage) propositions, namely of propositions which are neither necessity nor contingency propositions, but which are true not only at a certain instant in time. I argue that these propositions are true at least at two instants in time, but their presentation does not commit Alexander to a revision of his general semantic scheme for modal propositions, in which he showed that categorical propositions are not necessity propositions, and thus cannot be true at every instant in time. In the last section, I shall argue that Alexander's presentation of categorical (Greek passage) propositions is linked to his theory of predication and that such a semantic framework may explain the apparently difficult classification of this set of propositions.
Categorical (Greek passage) Propositions in Alexander of Aphrodisias' Modal Syllogistic
Gili L.
2020-01-01
Abstract
In this paper I deal with Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of categorical (Greek passage) propositions, namely of propositions which are neither necessity nor contingency propositions, but which are true not only at a certain instant in time. I argue that these propositions are true at least at two instants in time, but their presentation does not commit Alexander to a revision of his general semantic scheme for modal propositions, in which he showed that categorical propositions are not necessity propositions, and thus cannot be true at every instant in time. In the last section, I shall argue that Alexander's presentation of categorical (Greek passage) propositions is linked to his theory of predication and that such a semantic framework may explain the apparently difficult classification of this set of propositions.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
