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EnglishSharing economy platforms often use reputation systems to actively perform a‘regulatory’/control role, byexcluding from access to the platform users with ratings below a given threshold. We provide a multiple casestudy analysis of 9 platforms and investigate through a simple inter-temporal choice model the effect of thedesign of this specific application of online rating systems on users/providers’incentives to ensure a high level ofservice quality. Compliance with the platform’s behavioural rules is imperfect even with perfect reviews andeven if riders cannot switch across platforms. It can be increased by linking remuneration to performance and byincreasing the opportunity cost of reintegrating the endowment of reputation, also by influencing providers’perception of the magnitude of this cost. Thus, there may be an efficiency rationale for the controversial choiceto willingly preserve riders’uncertainty as to the operation of the algorithm and for portability of reputation.
| Titolo: | Platform-mediated reputation systems in the sharing economy and incentives to provide service quality: The case of ridesharing services |
| Autori: | |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2020 |
| Rivista: | |
| Abstract: | Sharing economy platforms often use reputation systems to actively perform a‘regulatory’/control role, byexcluding from access to the platform users with ratings below a given threshold. We provide a multiple casestudy analysis of 9 platforms and investigate through a simple inter-temporal choice model the effect of thedesign of this specific application of online rating systems on users/providers’incentives to ensure a high level ofservice quality. Compliance with the platform’s behavioural rules is imperfect even with perfect reviews andeven if riders cannot switch across platforms. It can be increased by linking remuneration to performance and byincreasing the opportunity cost of reintegrating the endowment of reputation, also by influencing providers’perception of the magnitude of this cost. Thus, there may be an efficiency rationale for the controversial choiceto willingly preserve riders’uncertainty as to the operation of the algorithm and for portability of reputation. |
| Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11564/716812 |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
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